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ANOTHER TRY AT TAKINGS LEGISLATION IN
SOUTH CAROLINA: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA SENATE BILL 528 AND THE FIGHT
FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory takings are at issue in the fight for property rights legislation
in South Carolina. Landowners want to have the freedom to use their land as
they wish. Although this is a reasonable desire, a landowner should not have
absolute power to use his land in ways contrary to regulations enacted for the
greater good of society.
Regulatory takings are unintentional takings of private property resulting
from regulations that are primarily intended to benefit society.' Physical
interference is usually absent, but the property is taken "by action 'other than
acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion.' 2 The regulation typically
affects the "private property by limiting, conditioning, or qualifying its use."3
"A regulatory taking occurs when a law benefiting the public has become an
unintentional taking by judicial fiat, usually because the law has destroyed or
excessively burdened a landowner's use of property."4
South Carolina Senate Bill 528 (Senate Bill 528), the "South Carolina
Private Property Rights Protection Act,"5 was introduced on March 29, 2001,
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and has been debated in the public
over the past year.6 Senate Bill 528 was proposed during the 2002 legislative
session and was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee in search of
alternatives.7 The proposed alternatives continued to be unacceptable;
therefore, the bill was still pending at the end of the legislative session, and it
essentially died.' Any new legislation in favor of private property rights will
have to be proposed during the next legislative session.9
1. JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTEcnON: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS, Part IV, § 8.02(C) (Aspen Law & Business Supp. 2001-2002).
2. Id. (citation omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. S. 528, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
6. See Private Property Rights: Hearing Before the Private Property Rights Task Force,
114th Gen. Assem. (S.C. Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Hearings].
7. Telephone Interview with Paula Benson, Senior Staff Counsel, S. C. Senate Judiciary
Committee (Sept. 6, 2002); see also A Message from Senator Larry A. Martin, available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/lamnessage2.htm.
8. Id.
9. Telephone Interview with Paula Benson, Senior Staff Counsel, S.C. Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Sept. 6, 2002).
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However, the Private Property Rights Task Force will be asking for
suggestions from the parties in the fall of 2002 and will be meeting to try and
reach a consensus on a piece of legislation to be introduced in January of
2003.10 Therefore, the issues raised by Senate Bill 528 continue to require
consideration and discussion. The Bill's unnecessary hardship standard was too
broad and overstepped the constitutional standard, so proposed bills in the
future should avoid its mistakes.
The Bill was aimed at providing an "inexpensive and expedited" procedure
to private property owners so that they could challenge governmental
restrictions on their real property." At the same time, the Bill was intended to
"preserv[e] the important and legitimate exercise of governmental regulatory
and land use programs.' 2 It recognized that government action affecting
private property can sometimes result in "unnecessary hardships" on the
property owner that do "not ris[e] to the level of a[n] [un]constitutional
taking."' 3 These hardships, while not takings, may be unfair to the private
property owner. 4 The Bill's provisions recognized that, regardless of whether
there is actually an unconstitutional taking or not, equity and fairness warrant
relief to the owner of the imposed property. 5
In effect, Senate Bill 528 would have made it easier for a private property
owner to challenge a government action or regulation. However, should it be
easier to challenge the government action or regulation? What happens when
policies of private property rights and the environment, historic preservation,
or other community interests are in conflict? What happens when the state or
county passes a land use ordinance in favor of the environment or historic
preservation and the private property owner challenges it as an unnecessary
hardship or a taking?
South Carolina has a rich environment in need of protection. From the
wetlands and marshes of the lowcountry to the foothills of the Appalachians,
the land of South Carolina is being consumed to build shopping centers, hotels,
and factories. Takings must be considered contemporaneously with
environmental initiatives and land use laws.
This Comment argues that takings legislation, such as that proposed by
Senate Bill 528, would have an adverse impact on the positive efforts of
environmental, historic, growth management, and community initiatives
because it would enable the private property owner to challenge regulations
more readily and recover money as a result of government actions or
regulations. Then, the government may become more reluctant to take
environmental measures because of the fear of expensive, compensatory pay-
10. Id.
11. S. 528, § 28-4-20(D).
12. Id.
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outs to private property owners. The government and public interest in
promoting environmental and community well-being is certainly important
enough to give careful consideration to the threshold that a property owner
must meet in order to challenge a law that advances a valid community or
public concern. South Carolina Senate Bill 528's unnecessary hardship standard
went beyond the constitutional standard and was too broad.
Part II of this Comment will lay out the background of takings law and
how the constitutional standard has evolved in modem cases. Furthermore, Part
II will highlight the history of the takings debate in South Carolina and offer
analysis of previous attempts at state takings legislation. Part III will analyze
the most recent bill, South Carolina Senate Bill 528, under some of the same
scrutiny imposed on the previous bills from environmental, economic, and
community perspectives. In addition, Part III will offer some current issues
involved in the takings debate. Part IV will conclude the analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
Takings involve constitutional and property concepts intertwined with
considerations of public policy. A brief outline of the takings concepts and a
look at some important takings cases will assist in the analysis of Senate Bill
528 to help make clear the potential impact the Bill could have had on
communities.
A. Takings Generally
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."1 6 This
clause limits the exercise of governmental power of taking property. It does not
prohibit the exercise of such power but imposes a condition on its use. 7 The
takings clause ensures that the private property owner is compensated if a
taking occurs."8 The government must have the fundamental right to "take"
property because it "is an attribute of sovereignty and is essential to the
existence of government."' 9
There are three means by which a government "takes" property. First,
under eminent domain, the state takes property because the property serves a
public use or purpose, and the state must give compensation.2 ° Secondly, the
state can take property under the police power when the property is harmful.2
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. 26 AM. JuR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (1996).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2.
21. Id. § 6.
2002]
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Under this power, there is no right to just compensation.22 Finally, a regulatory
taking occurs when the government imposes a regulation on one's land to serve
a public health, moral, or safety issue, and the property owner is unable to use
the land in the way he or she intended.23 If the government goes "too far" while
implementing a regulation restricting the use of private property, the private
property owner must be compensated.24 However, there are no bright lines to
determine when a regulation goes too far and constitutes a compensable
taking.25 These regulatory takings are the issues contemplated by Senate Bill
528.
"[A]ny government action imposing burdens on owners of private
property" may cause takings claims to arise.26 Typically, takings are alleged
when the property is subject to zoning regulations or a permit has been denied
for the property's development. 27 However, the mere fact that a governmental
regulation has an effect on private property does not make it a compensable
taking.28
B. Takings Jurisprudence: The Constitutional Standard
In order to understand more fully the takings standards in Senate Bill 528,
the following cases illustrate how the constitutional standard for takings
evolved and how it now stands and applies to a regulatory takings action.
Regulatory takings cases have attempted to construct tests to further define the
limits on regulations enacted by the government. In addition to an unnecessary
hardship standard, Senate Bill 528 had incorporated this constitutional standard
to decide whether a taking occurred.29
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission30
The Nollans originally leased seaside property with the option to buy.3
The option was conditioned on their promise to demolish the house on the
property and replace it.32 To fulfill this condition, they needed a permit from the
California Coastal Commission.33 They were granted the permit, but it was
22. Id.
23. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 358 (1998).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY, § 3.04
(1)(a) (Law Journal Press 2001); see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
27. ROBINSON, supra note 26, § 3.04(1)(a), at 3-18.
28. Id.
29. S. 528, § 28-4-40(A), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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subject to another condition that they grant an easement across a portion of
their property for better public access to a park and a public beach area.34 The
Nollans argued that the Commission could not impose the requirement unless
it showed evidence that their proposed development would adversely affect
public access to the beach. 3' The Commission, after holding a hearing on the
issue, reaffirmed the permit condition.36 In response, the Nollans filed a petition
arguing that the condition violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.37
They eventually appealed their case to the United States Supreme Court on this
issue. a
The Court stated "a 'permanent physical occupation' has
occurred... where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to
pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even
though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently
upon the premises." 9 The court compared the Nollans' easement to the cable
lines at issue in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.4 and
observed that "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' 41 Under
the rule of Loretto a "permanent physical occupation of property" by the
government is a "taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only a minimal
economic impact on the owner.,
42
The Nollan court reaffirmed that "land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."' 43 A broad range of
governmental purposes will qualify as "legitimate state interest[s]."" The
Commission had argued that the purposes for the condition on the Nollans'
permit were acceptable purposes to satisfy the requirement of legitimate state
interest. 5 It was imposed to "protect[] the public's ability to see the beach,"
"prevent[] congestion on the public beaches," and "assist[] the public in
overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach," a barrier which is
"created by a developed shorefront."4
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
37. Id.
38. Id. at831.
39. Id. at 832.
40. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419,433 (1982)).
42. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
43. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
44. Id. at 834-35.
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However, the Court found that the imposed condition on the building
permit did not have the "essential nexus" required between the condition and
the original purpose of the building restriction.47 In finding that the
Commission's argument had little merit, the Court stated "[i]t is quite
impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public
beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house. '48 The Commission's condition
on the Nollans' building permit was held to be a taking with the Court
reasoning that it is "inclined to be particularly careful ... where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective."49
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard"0
Dolan addressed a question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in
Nollan. In Nollan the Court did not decide what is the "required degree of
connection [needed] between the exactions imposed by the city and the
projected impacts, of the proposed development."'"
In Dolan the city of Tigard adopted a "Community Development Code"
(CDC) to comply with Oregon's comprehensive land-use management
program. 2 Provisions in the CDC included open space and landscaping
requirements, pedestrian and bicycle path requirements, and improvements to
the drainage plan near a local creek. 3 When Dolan applied for a permit to
redevelop her property in the Central Business District, the permit was granted
subject to all the provisions in the CDC.54 She pursued relief from these
conditions all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
To decide if these conditions were a regulatory taking, the Court used the
Nollan test of "whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state
interest' and the permit condition exacted by the city."55 The Court found the
required essential nexus in this case and proceeded to analyze "whether the
degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the
required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed
47. Id. at 837.
48. Id. at 838.
49. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
50. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
51. Id. at 377.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 377-78.
54. Id. at 379.
55. Id. at 386 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
[Vol. 54: 241
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development." 6 The Court adopted the "rough proportionality" test to evaluate
this required relationship. 7 Under this test, the Court ruled that the city did not
meet its burden of proving that the conditions to the permit were roughly
proportional to the impact of the proposed development.5" In other words, the
Court determined that the conditions on the permit, if fulfilled, would not solve
the problems. For example, "the city [had] never said why a public greenway,
as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control." 9
"The city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and
providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to how
this may be done. 60
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'
In this case Lucas purchased residential lots on the South Carolina coast,
and, at the time, they were not subject to any regulatory condition that would
prevent their development. 62 The State of South Carolina subsequently enacted
the Beachfront Management Act, which prevented Lucas from building on his
lots.63 Lucas subsequently filed suit claiming that the act was a taking of his
property entitling him to compensation because it rendered his property
valueless."
The Court began its analysis by elaborating on its prior holding in Agins
v. City of Tiburon61 that "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land." 66 The Court continued, "[w]e
think... that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that
when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good . . . he has
suffered a taking. '67 The Court emphasized that the state could only escape
payment of compensation "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use," if the state could show that
the use interests proscribed by the regulation "were not part of his title to begin
56. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987)).
57. Id. at 391.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 393.
60. Id. at 396.
61. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
62. Id. at 1006-07.
63. Id. at 1007.
64. Id. at 1009.
65. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
66. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))
(emphasis omitted).
67. Id. at 1019.
2002]
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with. '68 A limitation must be in the title to land itself, and "[a]ny limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must
inhere in the title itself.
69
4. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island7°
Palazzolo owned protected wetlands property on the coast of Rhode
Island. ' Twenty-six years after purchasing it,72 he desired to build a private
beach club on it, proposing to "fill [eleven] acres of the property with gravel to
accommodate '[fifty] cars with boat trailers, a dumpster, port-a-johns, picnic
tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash receptacles."' 73 To carry out
this plan he needed a special exception from the Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council (Council), and the exception would be granted
only for "compelling public purpose[s]" that benefit the public as a whole.74
The Council denied the exception and Palazzolo filed an action claiming that
the wetlands regulations had taken his property without just compensation.75
Palazzolo alleged that the Council's denial of the exception "deprived him
of 'all economically beneficial use' of his property."76 The Rhode Island court
used a rule combining the holdings of Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council77 and
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City78 and held: "A purchaser or a
successive title holder like [Palazzolo] is deemed to have notice of an earlier-
enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.
79
However, the United States Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that an
enactment made effective before the transfer of title does not "become[] a
background principle ofproperty law which cannot be challenged by those who
acquire title after the enactment. ' '8O The landowner can challenge a
governmental regulation even if he or she bought the property after the
68. Id. at 1027.
69. Id. at 1029.
70. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
71. Id. at611.
72. Palazzolo was not the original purchaser. In order to purchase the land in 1959 he and
some associates formed a corporation. After purchasing the property, Palazzolo bought out the
other shareholders and became the sole shareholder. In 1978 the company's corporate charter
was revoked because corporate income taxes had not been paid and the property passed to
Palazzolo. Id. at 613-14.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 615. The wetlands regulation went into effect in 1971. Id. at 614.
75. Id. at 615.
76. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019 (1992)).
77. 505 U.S. 1003.
78. 438 U.S. 104.
79. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
80. Id. at 629-30.
[Vol. 54: 241
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regulation was enacted. His or her notice of the regulation does not preclude a
takings challenge.
Therefore, the Court proceeded to analyze Palazzolo's claim that the
wetlands regulations deprived him of all economically beneficial use of his
property.8 ' The parties agreed that the property "retains $200,000 in
development value under the State's wetlands regulations., 8 2 Nevertheless,
Palazzolo claimed that he suffered a total taking and contended that the state
had left him with only "a few crumbs of value." 3 The Court observed that "a
State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner
is left with a token interest," but "[t]his is not the situation of [Palazzolo]. 84
The Court held that Palazzolo was not totally deprived of all economically
beneficial use because the property still "retains significant worth for
construction of a residence." 5 Therefore, there was no taking of his property
requiring just compensation.
C. Why the Constitutional Standard Is Important in South Carolina
At present, South Carolina has not enacted state takings legislation. Any
takings claims that arise are analyzed according to the constitutional standard
described by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Though Senate
Bill 528 would have relieved a landowner for an unnecessary hardship that was
imposed on him by a state regulation, the constitutional standard would still be
available.86 The state courts would analyze takings claims in South Carolina
with rules delineated in Nollan,"7 Dolan,88 Lucas,89 and Palazzolo.90 The
challenged regulations would be analyzed for their rough proportionality 9' to
the legitimate state interest,92 and the landowner would be asked to show that
he had lost all economically beneficial use of his property before he was
compensated. 93
The recent South Carolina Supreme Court decision ofMcQueen v. South
Carolina Coastal Council shows the use of the constitutional standard in state
takings cases. 94 McQueen bought two lots in Cherry Grove, one in 1961 and
81. Id. at 630.
82. Id. at 631.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
86. S. 528, § 28-4-40 (A), (B)(7)-(8), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
87. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
88. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
89. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
90. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
91. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
92. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
93. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
94. 340 S.C. 65, 530 S.E.2d 628 (2000).
2002]
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the other in 1963.9' In 1991, he desired to build bulkheads on the lots to prevent
further erosion; therefore, he applied to the South Carolina Coastal Council
(Council) for permits. 96 After some confusion, he was required to resubmit his
permit applications, and they were both "denied because the proposed
bulkheads were located within the tidelands critical area, so that any backfill
would result in filling of tidal wetlands, adversely affecting the environment."97
McQueen appealed to two appellate bodies, both of which upheld the permit
denials.98 The Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel found that the permit
denial was not a taking of McQueen's property because he had "no distinct
investment-backed expectations, as evidenced by his failure to take action to
prevent the erosion of his property." 99 However, the master-in-equity found that
the permit denial did deprive McQueen of all his investment-backed
expectations; therefore, the denial was a taking of his property.'00
The South Carolina Supreme Court, reciting language from Lucas,'°' stated
that "[t]he government 'takes' property for public use when it regulates the
property in a manner which denies the owner all economically beneficial use
of his property."'0 2 The elements of recovery on a regulatory takings claim
must establish that "1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the
property as a result of the regulatory imposition; 2) the property owner had
distinct investment-backed expectations; and 3) the interest taken was vested
in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and not within the power of the
state to regulate under common law nuisance doctrine."'0 3 Here, the South
Carolina Supreme Court said the permit denial "deprive[s] [the property owner]
of all economically viable use of his property."'" The court then considered the
Council's factual argument that McQueen had failed to take measures to
prevent erosion of his property and found this argument persuasive on the
second prong of the regulatory takings test."5 "Without the requirement of
investment-backed expectations, a property owner could obtain a windfall by
claiming a taking in the face of new regulations, without any real intent to
95. Id. at 67, 530 S.E.2d at 629.
96. Id. at 67, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
97. Id. at 68, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
98. Id. The Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel found that the permits McQueen
was seeking were prohibited by a South Carolina statute which "provides that the creation of
residential lots for private gain is not justification for filling in wetlands and that permit
applications forthis purpose should be denied." Id. (citing S.C. CODEANN. REGS. 30-12 (G)(2)(a)
(Supp. 1998)).
99. Id.
100. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 68, 530 S.E.2d at 630. The South Carolina Court of Appeals
agreed with the master that there was a taking, but remanded the issue of compensation. The
South Carolina Supreme Court granted the Council's petition for certiorari. Id.
101. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
102. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 69, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
103. Id. at 69, 539 S.E.2d at 630-31.
104. Id. at 69, 539 S.E.2d at 631.
105. Id. at 73-74, 539 S.E.2d at 633.
[Vol. 54: 241
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develop."'"6 The court found McQueen's "prolonged neglect of the property
and failure to seek developmental permits in the face of ever more stringent
regulations demonstrate[d] a distinct lack of investment-backed
expectations.""0 7 Since McQueen had failed to show that he had investment-
backed expectations, the court found that the denial of his permit applications
did not constitute a taking.! 8
D. The History of the Takings Debate in South Carolina
Takings has been an issue in South Carolina for a number of years.'09 In the
late nineties, several takings bills were introduced but never passed." 0 Since
1995, a team of developers and other interest groups, such as the South
Carolina Farm Bureau and South Carolina Timber Producers Association,"'
have pushed takings legislation in South Carolina." 2 Each bill was subtly
different but all seemed to result in extremely high costs to the taxpayers and
communities and a harsh negative effect on the ability of communities to plan
their growth." 3
1. Legislative Considerations of Past Takings Legislation
Proposals for private property rights legislation between 1995 and the
present have been diverse."' The first proposed bills expanded private property
owners' rights and offered expedited and less costly judicial processes for
enforcement of those rights. "5 During the 1995-1996 legislative session, South
Carolina Senate Bill 121116 enunciated that a taking occurs when a regulation
has the effect of "reduc[ing] the fair market value of real property to less than
fifty percent of its fair market value.""' 7 Later that session, South Carolina
106. Id. at 74, 539 S.E.2d at 633.
107. Id. at 76, 539 S.E.2d at 634-35.
108. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 77, 530 S.E.2d at 635.
109. F. Patrick Hubbard, "Takings Reform" and the Process of State Legislative Change
in the Context ofa "National Movement," 50 S.C. L. REv. 93, 121 (1998) ("[t]he takings reform
movement arrived in the South Carolina legislature in 1995").
110. S. 839, 111 th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995); S. 121, 111 th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 1995); H. 3591, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997); H. 3790, 111th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995).
111. Hearings, supra note 6.
112. Dana Beach, Takings Legislation or a Land Legacy for South Carolina: The Choice
is Ours, S.C. COASTAL CONSERVATION LEAGUE, Spring 2001, at 2.
113. Taking Too Much, Again, S.C. COASTAL CONSERVATION LEAGUE, Spring 2001, at 7,
14 [hereinafter Taking Too Much].
114. See Hubbard, supra note 109, at 126-27.
115. Id. at 122.
116. S. 121, 111th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995).
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House Bill 37901.. and South Carolina Senate Bill 839119 outlined assessment
requirements for the entity enacting the regulation and awarded compensation
if the effect of the regulation was a "substantial diminution of the total value of
the real property." 2'
During the 1997-1998 legislative session, South Carolina House Bill 3591
(House Bill 3591) was introduced.' In its original form, it preserved the
constitutional standard as the test for takings.'22 In addition, it appeared to give
more flexibility for resolving regulatory takings disputes by incorporating
methods such as exhaustion of administrative remedies, mediation, and a time
limit of 180 days before a party may commence suit for compensation. 2 3 The
Bill was later completely amended, and the body of the Bill was replaced with
the body of the Florida Harris Act. 124 The Bill as amended granted a "new right
to compensation that went far beyond the constitutional right for regulatory
takings."'125 Its "inordinately burdened" standard was a much broader right to
compensation. 2'
Professor Hubbard's 1998 South Carolina Law Review article thoroughly
addresses the possible reasons for the diversity of proposals from takings
reformers, concluding that the diversity is due to the unclear goals of the
reformers.'27 Professor Hubbard outlines three propositions to explain the
diversity:
1) The proponents of reform were not in agreement about
the goals of reform....
2) The proponents of reform agreed on goals but were
flexible about the details in any given bill in order to deal
with political realities and achieve these goals
incrementally.
3) The proponents of reform were more interested in the
symbolic goal of achieving some type of property rights
reform than changing any substantive or procedural
takings rules. '
118. H. 3790, 111 th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995).
119. S. 839, 111 th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995).
120. Hubbard, supra note 109, at 122-23 (quoting H. 3790, § 28-4-50(A), 1 1 1th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1995)).
121. H. 3591, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997).
122. Hubbard, supra note 109, at 123.
123. Id. at 123-24.
124. Id. at 124, 132; see H. 3591, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 2001).
125. Hubbard, supra note 109, at 125.
126. Id.
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2. Discussion of South Carolina House Bill 3591 and Florida's
Harris Act
In its final form, House Bill 3591129 was virtually identical to a bill in
Florida, the Harris Act. 3° The intent of both was "to broaden the circumstances
under which the property owner can obtain relief from government
regulation.''. Under House Bill 3591 the property owner must show that he
is "inordinately burdened" by the governmental regulation.'32 The Bill afforded
the government agencies alternatives to paying cash to the property owner,
such as variances or exceptions, as compromises.133 As. of 1998, Florida's
caselaw had not yet decided exactly what an "inordinate burden" was.
134
Caselaw in South Carolina would also have needed to define inordinate burden,
which could take time and money.
"Florida and South Carolina are profoundly different in some important
respects."' 3 15 What works for one state may not work for the other. One major
difference is that Florida is a much larger state than South Carolina; therefore,
it already had laws in place for planning and growth management and standards
of conservation by the time the Harris Act was enacted. 36 In addition, the
majority of Florida's laws cannot be challenged under the Harris Act because
it only applies to laws enacted after 1995.' Even so, as of 1998, Florida's
experience with the Harris Act included multiple claims challenging master
plans, and a chilling effect was causing less enactment and enforcement of laws
because of fear of litigation.131
In comparison, South Carolina has few laws regarding growth
management, planning and zoning, and conservation. '13 Some areas in South
Carolina are just beginning to enact zoning and comprehensive plans for
growth."4 The state has not set aside any money for payment of claims under
a property rights bill.' 4' Most of South Carolina's land is not protected;
129. H. 3591, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997).
130. Hubbard, supra note 109, at 124, 132; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp.
2001).
131. James F. Murley, Briefing at the Summit Club (February 10, 1998) (transcript available
from South Carolina Coastal Conservation League).
132. Id.
133. Id.




137. Murley, supra note 131.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See CHARLESTON, S.C., ZONING CODE art. 6, § 54-603 (2002). Charleston has a zoning
ordinance and land development plan "to encourage the arrangement of buildings, structures,
open space ... in a manner that will promote the public health, safety, convenience and welfare."
Id. See also Richland County Vision, available at http://www.richlandonline.com/vision.html.
141. Murley, supra note 131.
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therefore, under a bill like House Bill 3591, planning for growth would be
nearly impossible. 142 The anticipated chilling effect would reduce the proposal
of laws intended to protect the environment and plan for the future. "In South
Carolina as in Florida, growth management is not a choice but a necessity," and
it can work on managing its growth, "unless [it is] prematurely
burden[ed] ... with half a law that was meant to be part of a comprehensive
framework for managing growth."
143
South Carolina has had its own road to takings reform because of its
unique circumstances. It has characteristics that differentiate it from other
states, so takings reform should be unique to the state. 144 It is not appropriate
to merely mirror a bill from a state that has a completely different set of
circumstances.
3. Concerns ofHistoric Preservation Groups Under South Carolina
House Bill 3591
Historic preservation advocates also had objections to House Bill 3591 and
state takings legislation. Many towns and cities in South Carolina have
implemented historic preservation ordinances to protect historic sites in their
areas. 4 ' When protected by these ordinances, the historic properties have
increased in value and are used to increase tourism and help with the economic
development of surrounding areas. 4 6 Advocates of historic preservation alleged
that South Carolina House Bill 3591 would establish a barrier to communities
considering adopting historic preservation zoning ordinances. Under House Bill
3591, "a developer who wanted to tear down an antebellum home and build a
multi-story apartment building in a locally protected historic district could
argue that he was 'inordinately burdened' and demand payment because he had
lost the ability to get the higher economic return from the apartment
building."'47 House Bill 3591 would likely have caused communities not to
adopt historic preservation ordinances because of the fear of successful
challenges that the community would have been unable to afford. 48 The fear
of costs would prevent the historic areas from being protected, thus decreasing
the benefits with which they could have enriched the community. 1
49
142. Id.
143. Murley, supra note 131 (identifying the fact that the passage of South Carolina House
Bill 3591 would stymie any efforts South Carolina could undertake in the future for growth
management because they would either fail or be litigated at a high expense).
144. Hubbard, supra note 109, at 139-40.
145. See South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office, available at
http://www.state.sc.us/scdah/hpfsl.htm; Internal Memorandum from Mary Edmonds to Nancy
Vinson, Potential Effects of H. 3591 on Protection of Historic Properties (Nov. 21, 1997) (on file
with S.C. Coastal Conservation League) [hereinafter Memorandum].
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4. With Whose Property Rights are We Really Concerned?
Arguments arose about exactly whose property rights were being protected
under state takings bills-the landowners' rights or the surrounding property
owners' rights. 5 ° The past bills made clear that they did not protect any
"impacts to real property caused by an action of a governmental entity taken to
grant relief to a property owner under this section."'' If the developer is given
a variance, he will build his shopping center, and the surrounding property
owners are not protected when the value of their property decreases because of
it. Opponents of the bills see them as standing for the proposition that "all
property rights are equal, but some are more equal than others."' 2 Previous
takings bills have been opposed for taking power away from local governments
and local councils and putting it in the hands of lawyers and judges.'53 The
outcome was negatively viewed because the public would not be able to
participate in the local government decision-making process.' 54 If a judge is
deciding local planning issues, the public will have little say in the matter.'
The judge will make decisions about what is best for the community.
5. Economic Considerations of Past Takings Legislation
Florida economists and a panel of South Carolina planners, appraisers,
assessors, developers and attomeys prepared a study to estimate the economic
impact that House Bill 3591 would have had on the state and its citizens.'5 6 The
study found that the Bill would have created a loss to South Carolina's
economy, affecting landowners and the government. '57 The government's more
substantial loss would have turned into higher taxes, lower services, or both.5 8
Therefore, the citizens of South Carolina would have lost the most if the Bill
had passed. The study estimated that the Bill would have "cost South
Carolina's economy over $126,000,000" in the first year following
implementation, and that was stated to be a conservative estimate. 59 Of that
$126 million, taxpayers would pay $83 million "in the form of litigation costs,
awards to landowners, and administrative costs."' 60 Landowners' costs would
150. Cindi Ross Scoppe, Just Whose 'Rights 'Does the Property Rights Act Protect? THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 16, 1998, at A18.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Lobbyists Get Their Way in House on 'Takings 'Bill, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
May 29, 1997, at A12.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. FISHKIND & Assocs., THE FISCAL IMPACT OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS PROTECTION ACT, H. 3591 (Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter FISCAL IMPACT STUDY].
157. Id. at iii.
158. Id. atv.
159. Id. at iii-iv.
160. Id. at iii.
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have been about $44 million for litigation, which would most likely exceed
their awards in court. 161 In addition, the Act would likely have caused
communities to stop enacting zoning and land use regulations in order to avoid
potential costs of the Act.162 The lack of planning and zoning, which would
make areas more desirable to visit and live in, would thereby compound the
loss to the economy by decreasing tourism and causing development with
otherwise unnecessary infrastructure costs. 63 Zoning laws can increase
property values by putting limits on development; therefore, lack of zoning will
likely decrease property values, adding again to the economic loss triggered by
the Bill.
164
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MOST RECENT TAKINGS BILL: SOUTH CAROLINA
SENATE BILL 528
A. The State of the State with Respect to Takings
State takings legislation in the form of Senate Bill 528 would have the
effect of expanding the protections of private property owners to protect them
not only against physical invasions of property, but also against hardships
imposed by land use regulations and environmental regulations. This additional
protection exceeds the constitutional standard for takings. Takings is not a short
battle between conflicting interests. Before such protection is enacted, there
needs to be a long term consideration of the future of the state as a whole, not
as individual against individual. Takings should be considered on a larger scale,
encompassing a broader view of lifestyle in the state and how we as a society
want to move into the future.
65
South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges has enunciated that South Carolina
needs to concentrate more on land conservation and historic preservation.
66
Governor Hodges stated at the Governor's Summit on Growth in Myrtle Beach
in 2001 that "[w]e want to promote and preserve open space and be dedicated
to preserving our historic assets."' 67 Governor Hodges also observed that
regional planning for growth and land use is better than statewide planning
because it has the effect of keeping control within the cities and counties. 6
Environmental protections and decisions on how to manage growth in
South Carolina need to be more concrete before state takings legislation should
161. Id. at iii, v.
162. FISCAL IMPACT STUDY, supra note 156, at iii.
163. Id. at iv.
164. Id.
165. See John D. Echeverria, Reflections on Oregon Measure 7, McCall Speakers Series
(May 3, 2001) (transcript available at the S.C. Coastal Conservation League) at 16.
166. Mike Ramsey, Hodges Wants Stronger Conservation Efforts, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Mar. 13, 2001, atB1.
167. Id.
168. Id. at B5.
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become effective. South Carolinians should decide how the state and citizens
are going to manage these issues as they arise. If regulations are in place before
takings legislation takes effect, then landowners and prospective purchasers of
land will have notice that their land is going to be affected by the regulations,
weakening their challenge to implementation. They ideally will have adjusted
their intentions and ideas for developing their land according to the long range
plans of the state. They should anticipate future enactments tailored to
furthering South Carolina's environmental, historic preservation, and growth
management initiatives. 1
69
Under Palazzolo7 ' the regulation is not immune from being an
unconstitutional taking solely because a landowner had notice of the regulation
affecting the land when he purchased it. 7' However, "[t]he goal should be to
ensure that public monetary relief does not provide an incentive for continuing
resistance to necessary and appropriate social change."' 72 A takings bill may
encourage the landowners to selfishly resist change, so they can make money
through compensation. Ideally, there should be a balance between individual
interests and the common good.
B. Environmental Group Concerns
Environmental groups, municipalities, and other groups were opposed to
Senate Bill 528. To sum up the feeling of environmentalists in the state toward
takings legislation, Nancy Stone-Collum of the South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League said "the constitutional standard is just fine."' 73 The
groups viewed the takings legislation as a virtual blank check from the state to
developers, corporations, agricultural and timber interests, homebuilders, and
realtors.' Takings legislation would have resulted in the developers getting
paid "not to sprawl, pollute, and otherwise damage [the] quality of life [in the
area]." 7 ' At the crux of much debate were the Comprehensive Land Use Plans,
and the accompanying zoning laws necessary to implement them, because
developers hoped to protect themselves from the effects of such plans through
takings legislation.'76 A few areas in South Carolina have passed or are
considering comprehensive plans to control urban sprawl and to protect rural
areas and farms.'77 The comprehensive plans consider issues such as quality of
169. Echeverria, supra note 165, at 17.
170. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
171. Id. at 629-30.
172. Echeverria, supra note 165, at 17.
173. Interview with Nancy Stone-Collum, Legislative Director, S.C. Coastal Conservation
League (Sept. 14, 2001).
174. Taking Too Much, supra note 113, at 6.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 6-7.
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life of the residents, traffic problems, environmental protection, and
communities' needs, in addition to property rights and costs, which, when
considered together, amount to the communities' visions of the future.'78
According to Nancy Stone-Collum, the Legislative Director at the South
Carolina Coastal Conservation League, "[i]f this bill becomes law, taxpayers
will have two choices... [they] could fight developers in court, or just pour
[their] hard-earned cash straight into [the developers'] pockets.'
179
C. Political Considerations
Senate Bill 528 was promoted as a mechanism to protect small landowners
from government intrusion; however, on closer inspection, the list of bill
supporters shows that big business developers were the groups pushing for the
takings legislation.8 0 The big businesses "are simply trying to reduce the
regulations they operate under.''.
At this time, South Carolina's population is growing quickly and our
landscape is threatened by urban sprawl. "Good planning and effective
strategies to protect rural areas and wildlife habitat have never been more
important."'8 2 The planning for growth will be impeded if takings legislation
like Senate Bill 528 are passed. The cities and counties of South Carolina
would be burdened with litigating takings claims, paying off the developers,
and compromising their intentions by granting variances and allowing such
exceptions as a factory hog farm on a riverbank.'83
Proponents of the Bill praised it for keeping a grip on the government's
powers over property owners. They viewed it as an assurance that the
government would not overstep its bounds. However, the Bill would have
given property owners the license to do whatever they wanted with their land,
unless someone were to pay them through just compensation. It put the
government between a rock and a hard place. The government, in trying to
uphold an ordinance's purpose, would have had to pay enormous sums of
money or would be forced to let the developer violate the ordinance-neither
of which follows the intent of the ordinance.'84
A poll of South Carolinians in 2000 showed that less than half would agree
to government restrictions on new developments.8 5 Environmental experts
178. Taking Too Much, supra note 113, at 6-7.
179. Id. at 14.
180. J. William Holliday, Takings Bills Would Open Door For Factory Hog Farms, THE




184. See Richard Miniter, Real-Estate Broker From Hell, READER'S DIG., Feb. 2001, 114-
17.
185. Mike Ramsey, Poll Shows Little Support for Slowing Growth, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Dec. 11, 2000, at A6.
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attribute this low number to residents' rural or urban location in the state.1 6 In
urban areas, growth management is obviously a larger consideration, while in
rural areas, growth management is "not an issue."' 7 There are other polls that
have shown slightly higher numbers of residents who would be in support of
growth regulations."' 8 The bottom line is that some, not all, residents of South
Carolina see a problem with growth, and some, not all, residents would be
willing to pay higher taxes for the government to buy undeveloped land for the
purpose of protecting it from development." 9
Under Senate Bill 528, that is exactly what the government would have had
to do, except the public would not be prepared for the taxes that would be
required. The takings bill would have, in effect, raised the price of land to a
premium because the landowners would be able to show unnecessary hardship
and be paid compensation. Land-use restrictions that do not rise to the level of
an unconstitutional taking may create an unnecessary hardship on the
landowner under Senate Bill 528. Therefore, the government would have to
buy the land, rather than regulate it, in order to keep it undeveloped.
D. The "Fine Print" of South Carolina Senate Bill 528
Senate Bill 528 provided for a step-by-step process through which the
private property owner could challenge and receive relief for the taking or
unnecessary hardship imposed on his property. 9 The process included notice
provisions for the government, settlement negotiations provisions, and a
requirement for approval of the settlement agreement.' 9 If a private property
owner chose to reject a settlement offer, the Bill provided for judicial
determination of the issue of taking or unnecessary hardship imposed. 9'
Property rights in South Carolina are becoming an increasingly important
issue. 93 Growing populations need places to live, work, and play. As the
population grows, citizens want to preserve their quality of life and want to stop
the expansion of hog farm operations, strip clubs in their neighborhoods, and
standstill traffic on their roads. "' The big business developers and industrialists
can afford to take their problems to court and litigate their takings claims. 9
However, others in the state, such as ordinary property owners, may be unable
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Thus, the constitutional standard that protects property
owners is sufficient, but the appeals process is
flawed . . . . [T]here is a basis for a compromise on the
property rights issue: No change in the constitutional
standard for how a taking is defined, but an improved appeals
process by which aggrieved property owners can seek
relief. 96
This attitude does not wish to harm the ordinary private property owner and
favors enacting and enforcing laws that work to preserve our state lands and
quality of life. The constitutional standard, as set forth in the cases Nollan,97
Dolan,'"8 Lucas,'99 and Palazzolo,00 is appropriate to achieve both ends.
1. The Constitutional Standard
The constitutional standard achieves the appropriate ends because it weighs
the effect of the challenged regulation against its purpose. The standard
scrutinizes the regulation itself and ensures that it is pointed toward a legitimate
state interest. If the regulation does advance a legitimate state interest, the
standard analyzes the harm done to the property owner. If the harm done is not
roughly proportional to the legitimate state interest, then the regulation has
effected a taking of property and the state must pay for it. The property owner
must show that the regulation interfered with his or her investment-backed
expectations and that the land was left with no economically viable use.
2. South Carolina Senate Bill 528 in Detail
This section analyzes the specific language of the Bill and outlines
potential consequences of its language as applied to specific hypothetical
situations. It further compares the constitutional standard with the Bill's
unnecessary hardship standard, which would cast a larger safety net for
property owners. Examination of the Bill's settlement procedure will show that,
though it would have likely expedited the process, it was flawed when
combined with the unnecessary hardship standard for compensation.
The Bill's proposed standard for just compensation is set out in § 28-4-
40(A):
"When a specific action of a governmental entity has the
effect of a constitutional taking of real property or has
196. Id.
197. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
198. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
199. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
200. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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resulted in an unnecessary hardship on the use of the real
property, the property owner of that real property is entitled
to relief . . . which relief may include, but does not
necessarily require, compensation for the actual loss of the
fair market value of the real property caused by the action of
government."2 01
This "unnecessary hardship" standard is lower than the constitutional standard.
The constitutional standard requires the property owner to show he has suffered
an unconstitutional taking, which triggers the legitimate state interest test and
the test for loss of all economically viable use and investment-backed
expectations. This unnecessary hardship standard would have only required the
landowner to show that he suffered a "disadvantage by operation of a
governmental action so that application of the government statute, regulation,
ordinance, or other action results in a restriction more burdensome than
intended or ... effectively prohibits or unreasonably restricts the utilization of
the property."2 2 It would take time for case law to define the limits of
"unreasonable" and "more burdensome," but a private landowner whose land
is affected by an ordinance would most likely be able to show an unnecessary
hardship much more easily than an unconstitutional taking.
For instance, if a developer owned land in a scenic area and the town
enacted a five-story building height limitation, then the developer could
potentially have been paid for the "unreasonable" restriction of his property if
he intended to build a twenty story building on his land. In the alternative, the
developer could get a variance to build a twelve story building, against the
wishes of the citizens of the town. The citizens in effect lose either way
because either the building violates the ordinance and disrupts the height
limitation or the developer is paid for his supposed economic loss. Under the
constitutional standard, the regulation of building height would be tested and
most likely found to be a legitimate state interest, since scenic preservation
usually qualifies.0 3 Furthermore, the height restriction would be roughly
proportional to this state interest, since enforcing the height restriction would
achieve the desired goal of scenic preservation.2' 4 Under the constitutional
standard, it is not a frivolous regulation enacted to reach a fictional goal.
Senate Bill 528 stated "[n]othing in this chapter shall be considered to
prevent the exercise of the police powers of any governmental entity to adopt
or modify lawful zoning ordinances or comprehensive land use plans consistent
with the provisions of this chapter."2 5 That may be true, but the statement itself
is empty. It merely says that the governmental entities may enact zoning
201. S. 528, § 28-4-40 (A), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
202. S. 528, § 28-4-40 (B)(8), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
203. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
204. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
205. S. 528, § 28-4-40 (C), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
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ordinances and comprehensive land use plans, but the same is true in the Bill's
absence. The statement appeared to give protection to the governmental
entities, but it said no more than what they already could do. The Bill would
have just made it easier to challenge the lawful ordinances and plans
successfully. Its provisions would have created conflict and would likely have
slowed down any community plans for the future.
In sections 28-4-40(D)(1) and (D)(2), the Bill purported to protect
regulations and ordinances when a private property owner successfully
challenges governmental action against his property.2"6 If the government were
to strike a settlement agreement with the property owner that
"would have the effect of a... variance or []exception to the
application of a regulation or ordinance as it would otherwise
apply to the subject real property, the governmental entity
must ensure the relief granted protects the public interest
served by tfie regulations at issue and is the appropriate relief
necessary to prevent the governmental action from taking or
imposing an unnecessary hardship on the real property."2 °7
This provision seemed to have protected the public interest in making the
ordinance in the first place, but it is unclear how an exception to the ordinance
would still protect the public interest when, at the same time, it does not impose
the ordinance on the property because of an unnecessary hardship to the owner.
The two seem to be in direct conflict. In addition, it is unclear who would have
decided whether the settlement would fulfill both conditions of the settlement.
The Bill could have left open the possibility for cutting comers on the
requirement that the settlement relief continue to protect the public interest. The
concept sounds good but may not have been realistic.
Under section 28-4-50(D)(2), if someone were to have decided that the
settlement agreement would "have the effect of contravening the application
of a statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property," then the
issue would have gone to court.2"9 A judge would have had an opportunity to
approve or disapprove of the settlement, which was thought "to ensure that the
relief granted protects the public interest served by the statute at issue and is the
appropriate relief necessary to prevent .. . a taking or the imposition of an
unnecessary hardship on the real property."2 9 The judge would be deciding, for
the whole community, what to do with the land. It seems that the county
council or planning board would be the best for making the local decisions,
especially since the public and members of the community would have more
input. However, the Bill gives the judge the final decision. A single
206. S. 528, § 28-4-50 (D)(1), (2), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
207. Id. § 28-4-50 (D)(1).
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adjudication of a settlement agreement's validity is not overly taxing on the
judicial system, but this legislation would have allowed a deluge of claims to
arise. In addition, a judge may not have the public interest at heart. The judge,
as an individual, will decide what the community needs, which is contrary to
how public enactments should work. !
If the property owner rejected the settlement offer, he would have filed a
claim so that the Administrative Law Judge could have determined whether the
governmental action resulted in a taking of the private property or if it imposed
an unnecessary hardship on the property.2"' Again an individual judge would
have made the decision with no input from the public. In the case of a
governmental action to protect wetlands or another environmental concern, the
agency enacting the regulation or ordinance would have to participate in
litigation. Therefore, the public, whose interest was forefront, would now have
been the recipient of the bill for litigation in the form of higher taxes.
Senate Bill 528 addressed unconstitutional takings of, and unnecessary
hardships imposed on, private property. It centered on the fact that the property
owner is entitled to relief in the form of a variance, exception, or cash
compensation. The developer would have won under this Bill even if there
were no unconstitutional taking of his or her property, as long as there was an
unnecessary hardship imposed on his or her property. The developer would
have received either money or an exception to use the property however he or
she wants. If he or she could show an unconstitutional taking under the
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court, he or she deserves the
relief, so the Bill's additional protection would be redundant.21' The broad
definition of the unnecessary hardship standard goes too far beyond the
constitutional standard.
For example, if a community wanted to adopt zoning laws to curb the
effects of urban sprawl or development in the area, the citizens would have a
hard time passing the ordinances. Their reasons for attempting to manage
sprawl may be laudable, such as decreasing pollution or traffic in a congested
area or school area, or increasing the size of a park, or injecting green space
into a certain area for the first time. However, under this Bill, if the developer
alleged that he could not erect his new shopping center in an area covered by
the new plan, he might have shown the requisite unnecessary hardship. The
developer would be paid for the hardship or would be given a variance to build
the shopping center anyway. Either of those results would have been
undesirable from the citizen's perspective. The citizen's taxes might have
increased to fund the large payoff to the developer, or the citizen might have
to deal with even more traffic and pollution. Therefore, enactment of the
community zoning law would have caused the exact opposite result of what it
was intended to do. It is a twisted turn of events, costing the taxpayers, whose
210. S. 528, § 28-4-60 (B), and § 28-4-70 (A), 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
211. S. 528, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
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interests were at heart originally, the most in the form of cash and decreased
quality of life.
E. Can South Carolina Senate Bill 528 or Future Proposals Be Cured?21
Many interest groups' voices and opinions on the Bill have been heard at
public hearings on private property rights in South Carolina." 3 A primary
change that would likely increase the acceptability of the Bill would be the
removal of the unnecessary hardship standard from the analysis, leaving the
constitutional standard. The removal would level the playing field between
private property owners and opponents of the Bill because it would have given
the appropriate protections to the regulations. The constitutional standard
would be a way to sufficiently protect all interests because the Bill, as written,
presumed that the private property owner's rights are always unjustifiably
violated by regulations, leaving the regulations with virtually no chance to be
enforced.
Another possible modification to the Bill could be a provision instructing
the private property owner to give written notice of his claim, settlement offer,
and ripeness decision to the public interest groups, individuals, and
organizations that have expressed an interest. With that change, it seems that
the interested groups would be prepared to defend the claim and would be kept
abreast of developments on the issue. In addition, an exhaustion provision
could be added so that the complaining private property owner would exhaust
all remedies before going to court. This would ensure that his claim is ripe, that
the final decision has been made with respect to the use of his property, and
that he did not go to court before he investigated whether or not an alternative
remedy could be reached.
A mediation provision would be a possible alternative remedy. Through
mediation, perhaps a compromise or settlement could be reached, rather than
going through the costly process of court proceedings. A provision preventing
the complaining property owner from taking his claim to court until after a
settlement is offered and rejected and after mediation fails could help avoid
unnecessary litigation.
Furthermore, the word "variance" should be omitted from the Bill in order
to preserve an ordinance or regulation's purpose and to avoid a violation of it
even if a taking occurs. For example, consider the building height restrictions
hypothetical mentioned above. If the limit was ten stories and the property
owner wanted to build twenty-five, the property owner may obtain a variance,
compromising the height restriction. The preferable outcome would be for the
property owner to be compensated under the constitutional standard rather than
to be given a variance. However, this approach would still have caused
exorbitant expenses.
212. For information on proposed drafts of Senate Bill 528, see Real Property Rights Task
Force, at http://www.scstatehouse.net/proptask.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
213. Hearings, supra note 6.
[Vol. 54: 241
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss1/10
PROPERTY LAW
F. General Observations Regarding Takings Legislation and the
Perspectives
A public hearing in front of the Private Property Rightsi Task Force on
private property rights in the South Carolina State House, raised a number of
observations, as proponents and opponents of takings legislation expressed
their views and shared their stories.2"4 Proponents of Senate Bill 528 stated,
often in conclusory terms, that "we deserve protection" and 'our rights are
being trampled on. ' 215 However, no one gave evidentiary support for their
rhetorical statements. The proponents came across as short-sighted. In contrast,
opponents to the Bill cited specific examples of possible outcomes that would
result under the Bill and the negative impacts of the outcomes." 6 The
opponents clearly enunciated their concerns and supported them with
examples.
It becomes clear that no one opposes private property rights nor wants to
take them away. Opponents of the Bill think it is an incorrect protection of
private property rights and should be amended to be more effective and
balanced in its protections. Senate Bill 528 did not achieve the proper balance
between private rights and necessary regulations. Although the private property
owner has rights, they are not absolute ones that he may exercise to the
detriment of society. To draft acceptable state takings legislation, we must
become more aware of the changing times and growth in our area. We must
look into the future to view how our current decisions will impact us and future
generations.
IV. CONCLUSION
South Carolina is a beautiful state with a rich environment and lush
landscapes. The South Carolina Private Property Rights Protection Act as
Senate Bill 528 would have changed the look and feel of the state. It sounded
like a good proposition, protecting the private property owner, but who were
we really protecting? Big corporate developers would have claimed
unnecessary hardship incessantly when and if South Carolina citizens wanted
to do something about managing growth or preserving the environment and
community well-being in the state. Our pockets would have been empty and
our land would have been covered with buildings and parking lots. The
untouched, pristine areas are fast disappearing. We must catch them before they
are gone. Senate Bill 528 would cause an unnecessary hardship on the public
and the environment if implemented, at everyone's cost. Proposed legislation
in the future must avoid its mistakes.
Courtney P. Stevens
214. Id. at 213. Members of the task force are Senator Larry A. Martin, Senator Luke A.
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